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Team gamesWereport on two studies investigating themotivations (“ingroup love” and “outgroup hate”) underlying individ-
ual participation in intergroup conﬂict between natural groups (fans of football clubs, supporters of political
parties), by employing the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma Maximizing-Difference (IPD-MD) game. In this game
groupmembers can contribute to the ingroup (at a personal cost) and beneﬁt ingroupmembers with or without
harmingmembers of an outgroup. Additionally, we devised a novel version of the IPD-MD inwhich the choice is
between beneﬁting ingroup members with or without helpingmembers of the outgroup. Our results show an
overall reluctance to display outgroup hate by actively harming outgroup members, except when the outgroup
was morality-based. More enmity between groups induced more outgroup hate only when it was operational-
ized as refraining from help.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).2 Following, e.g., Brewer (1999), De Dreu (2010), De Dreu et al. (2010), Halevy et al.“As far as I'm concerned they're bad people, just bad people.”1
[Schalke FC fan about Dortmund FC fans]
There is a joke about an old man who was a lifelong fan of the local
football club. When his doctor told him he was about to die he canceled
his season ticket, and became a fan of another club, his old club's worst
and most hated rival. When asked “why change clubs just before you
die?” he replied “better one of them dying than one of us”.
Our society is marked by many forms of intergroup conﬂict. Wars
between countries, clashes between ethnic and religious groups, long-
lasting guerilla campaigns, and rivalries between street gangs or groups
of sport fans have severe negative consequences to members of theel).
. This is an open access article underparticipating groups, and sometimes also to un-involved bystanders
(e.g., Cohen & Insko, 2008; Levitt & Venkatesh, 2000; McDonald,
Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012). Despite being (by deﬁnition) an inter-
group phenomenon, intergroup conﬂict is ultimately made possible by
the actions of the individuals who take part in the conﬂict. These indi-
viduals often incur personal costs by participating in the conﬂict, but
their precise motivation is ambiguous. The willingness to incur the
cost of participation can be a result of a cooperative desire to help the
ingroup (“ingroup love”), an aggressive/competitive motivation to
hurt the outgroup or increase the gap between the groups (“outgroup
hate”), or a combination of both (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999).2(2008), and Halevy et al. (2012), we use “ingroup love” and “outgroup hate” to describe
speciﬁc behavioralmotivations in the context of intergroup conﬂict. The terms do not nec-
essarily carry the emotional connotation often associatedwith “love” and “hate”. Other au-
thors use different terms, e.g., “ingroup favoritism” and “outgroup hostility” (Greenwald &
Pettigrew, 2014), to convey similar concepts.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Table 1
Games, actions, and payoffs (Studies 1 and 2).
Effect on
Ingroup member Outgroup member
Game Action 1 (self) 2 3 1 2 3
IPD Keep +€40 0 0 0 0 0
Between group pool +€20 +€20 +€20 −€20 −€20 −€20
IPD-MD (original) Keep +€40 0 0 0 0 0
Between group pool +€20 +€20 +€20 −€20 −€20 −€20
Within group pool +€20 +€20 +€20 0 0 0
IPD-MD (positive) Keep +€40 0 0 0 0 0
Between group pool +€20 +€20 +€20 +€20 +€20 +€20
Within group pool +€20 +€20 +€20 0 0 0
Note: The table illustrates the effect an individual's action has on her own payoff, the payoff of each of two other ingroupmembers, and that of the three outgroupmembers. Each player's
ﬁnal payoff is determined by the combined effect of the six (three ingroup + three outgroup) players' actions.
3 The higher contribution rate in the IPD as compared to an equivalent single group
prisoner's dilemma game is in line with the intergroup conﬂict — intragroup coopera-
tion/cohesion hypothesis (Benard & Doan, 2011; Bornstein, 2003), which claims that
intragroup cooperation increases if the intragroup conﬂict is embedded in an intergroup
conﬂict.
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motivations for individual participation in intergroup conﬂict has been
the focus of recent experimental work. The results suggest that ingroup
love, rather than outgroup hate, is the main motivation at work (De
Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008;
Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012).
We extend this line ofwork in twoways. First,we examine behavior of
members of natural groups, as opposed to the above-mentioned work
which is based on laboratory games played between artiﬁcially created
groups, members of which do not share any meaningful characteristics
or history. In addition to increasing external validity, basing group mem-
bership onnatural groups allows for thequasi-experimentalmanipulation
of key characteristics of real intergroup conﬂicts, namely the degree of en-
mity between groups (Diekhof,Wittmer, &Reimers, 2014), and the extent
to which the intergroup relations are based on similar or opposing moral
convictions (Haidt, 2001; Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013).
Second, we allow participants to exhibit outgroup hate by not help-
ing the opponent group, rather than only by directly harming it, a
distinction that has been shown to make a behavioral difference
(e.g., Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Mummendey et al., 1992). Includ-
ing the option to exhibit outgroup hate by help-avoidance allows us to
test whether previous results, which stress the prevalence of ingroup
love as themainmotivation at play, are limited to caseswhere outgroup
hate can be expressed by direct harm.
Individual motivation in intergroup conﬂict: “ingroup love” and/or
“outgroup hate”
Intergroup conﬂict is complex. Alongside the obvious conﬂict be-
tween groups, it often involves internal conﬂicts within each competing
group. Individual group members face a tension between their self-
interest and their group's welfare, and can also be motivated by
concerns regarding the other group(s). The Intergroup Prisoner's Dilem-
ma (IPD) game (Bornstein, 1992) is amodel of intergroup conﬂictwhich
simultaneously considers the intragroup and intergroup levels of con-
ﬂict. Each groupmember decides whether (or howmuch) to contribute
to the group's effort. Contribution is costly to the individual, beneﬁcial to
the ingroup, and harmful to the outgroup (see Table 1). The intragroup
level of conﬂict is captured by the tension between individual and group
interests: non-contribution maximizes the individual's payoff, but
group payoffs are maximized when individuals contribute as much as
possible. The intergroup level of conﬂict is captured by the tension be-
tween group and collective interests: while each group is best served
by maximal contributions by its members, the most efﬁcient outcome
from the collective point of view, that of all individuals from both
groups, is that no one contributes anything.
Despite the negative effect on collective welfare, there are substan-
tial contributions to the group pool in the IPD. In some cases these con-
tributions are considerably higher than those in a structurallyequivalent single-group prisoner's dilemma game, in which contribu-
tion has no adverse effect on the outgroup (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef,
1994).3 Contribution in the IPD, as in the real world intergroup conﬂicts
which it models, has two consequences: increasing the ingroup's wel-
fare and decreasing the outgroup'swelfare. Contribution is thusmotiva-
tionally ambiguous and can be attributed either to ingroup love or to
outgroup hate. The motivation for non-contribution is also not clear,
but can be either plain selﬁshness or a reluctance to harm the outgroup.
In an attempt to behaviorally disentangle the motivational ambigu-
ities in the IPD, the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma-Maximizing Difference
(IPD-MD) game (Halevy et al., 2008) provides individuals with an addi-
tional option. They can choose between non-contribution, contribution
to a between-group pool, which is costly to the individual, beneﬁcial to
the ingroup, and harmful to the outgroup (as in the IPD), or to a within-
group pool which is also costly to the individual and beneﬁcial to the
ingroup, but does not affect the outgroup (see Table 1). Helping the
ingroup in the IPD-MD is possible either with (between-group pool)
or without (within-group pool) harming the outgroup. Harming the
outgroup, however, is possible only by contributing to the between-
group pool, so these contributions are rather clear indications of an
aggressive and/or competitive motivation towards the outgroup
(i.e., outgroup hate). Similarly, non-contribution is unambiguously self-
ish as it cannot bemotivated by a reluctance to harm the outgroup or to
increase collective welfare.
Halevy et al. (2008) compared behavior in the IPD and IPD-MD.
Their results are clear-cut: while there were considerable contributions
to the between-group pool in the IPD game (about 30%), there were
hardly any in the IPD-MD game (about 6%). Additionally, overall contri-
butions increased when players had the possibility to beneﬁt the
ingroup without necessarily harming the outgroup (i.e., in the IPD-
MD). These results show an overwhelming preference for ingroup
love over outgroup hate when players can behaviorally discriminate
between the two motivations. Similar results have been obtained
when comparing the IPD and the IPD-MD games in a repeated-game
setting, even after an artiﬁcially created “history of conﬂict”, in which
only the between-group pool was available for a certain number of rep-
etitions before the within-group pool was introduced as a third option
(Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012).Minimal vs. natural groups and positive vs. negative externalities
The strong preference for ingroup love over outgroup hate in the IPD-
MD is seemingly in contrast with at least onemajor theory of intergroup
4 Some examples are the rivalry between the Boston Celtics and the Los Angeles Lakers,
which is mainly a result of meeting in twelve NBA ﬁnals between 1959 and 2010; the
game between the left-wing oriented FC St. Pauli and the right-wing oriented FC Hansa
Rostock, dubbed the “political derby” (sometimes also the “fear derby”) in German foot-
ball, and often a catalyst for violent clashes between fan groups; and the Glasgow Derby
between Celtic F.C. and Rangers F.C. in Scottish Football which lies at the heart of Scottish
“Sectarianism”, dividing fans along religious (catholic vs. protestant) and political (conser-
vatism vs. socialism) lines.
5 85% of post graduate democrats deﬁne themselves as “pro-choice” (Ertelt, 2011).
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Turner, 1979, 1986; seeHogg, Abrams, Otten,&Hinkle, 2004, for anover-
view). According to SIT, groupmembers aim tomaximize relative rather
than absolute outcomes in comparison to outgroupmembers, in order to
create positive distinctiveness. In the IPD-MD this implies using the
between-group pool, which harms the outgroup while helping the
ingroup, increasing the gap between the groups (in the ingroup's
favor). The infrequent use of the between-group pool in previous
laboratory experiments, however, shows that group members had little
concern for their group's relative standing vis-à-vis the other group.
We propose that there are at least two reasons for this somewhat
surprising result. First, previous research using the IPD-MD investigated
very “minimal” groups. The artiﬁcial group categories had no meaning
or prior history over and above the positive outcome interdependence
of ingroup members in the game, such that participants' ties with
their groups (“group commitment”; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002)
were rather weak. Furthermore, participants had no particular reason
to evaluate the opposing group negatively, to feel threatened by it, or
to view it asmorally opposed. These are perhaps not themost favorable
conditions for outgroup hate to emerge. In real world intergroup con-
ﬂicts (e.g., between ethnic, religious, or political groups) group commit-
ment is typically high, opposing groups are evaluated negatively, are
often perceived as a severe threat for the ingroup's welfare, and conﬂict
can have a strong moral dimension (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; see Riek,
Mania, & Gaertner, 2006, for a meta-analysis). Therefore, the low levels
of outgroup hate observed in previous studies may be the result of lack
of group commitment or insufﬁcient negative attitudes towards the op-
posing group (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). Brewer (1999) argued
that ingroup love is a function of positive attitudes towards the ingroup,
whereas outgroup hate is a function of negative attitudes towards the
outgroup. In a similar vein, Cuddy, Fiske, &Glick (2007) claim that active
harm towards another group is associated with low warmth stereo-
types. Furthermore, Parker & Janoff-Bulman (2013) demonstrate that
morality-based group identiﬁcation is inductive to negative outgroup
emotions.
Second, in the IPD-MDparticipants could display outgroup hate only
by choosing the between-group pool, thereby actively imposing a
negative externality on members of the outgroup. In many real world
intergroup relations, however, outgroup hate may be shown rather in-
directly, for instance by not hiring an outgroup applicant or avoiding
to help an outgroup member in need. Here, outgroup hate is displayed
passively by avoiding to impose a positive externality on outgroup
members (see e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007, on the distinction between active
and passive harm). Previous research suggests that the distinction
between positive and negative outgroup externalities has behavioral
implications. The positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination
(Buhl, 1999; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Mummendey, Otten, Berger,
& Kessler, 2000; Mummendey et al., 1992) postulates that intergroup
discrimination emerges mostly in the allocation of positive, rather
than negative, resources. Greenwald & Pettigrew (2014) (see also
Banaji & Greenwald, 2013) review a host of laboratory and ﬁeld exper-
iments, and conclude that present-day discrimination in America is pri-
marily a result of selectively helping members of advantaged groups,
rather than harming members of disadvantaged groups. Given the cen-
tral role that help-avoidance seems to play in intergroupdiscrimination,
the low levels of outgroup hate in previous studies might be attributed
to the focus on negative, rather than positive, externalities on the
outgroup.
The current research
To examinewhether the infrequent use of outgroup hate in previous
work is a result of groups' artiﬁciality and/or the focus on negative ex-
ternalities, we studied the behavior of members of natural groups—fans
of football clubs (Study 1) and supporters of political parties (Study
2)—in settings where displays of outgroup hate were possible by eitherimposing a negative externality, or refraining from imposing a positive
externality, on the outgroup.
Degree of enmity and moral convictions among natural groups
The degree of enmity between natural groups is often relational
(i.e., particular to speciﬁc pairs of groups). In sports, some teamsmerely
compete in the same league, while others have long historic rivalries
fueled by regular direct competition for titles or differences in fan
bases' political preferences or religious identiﬁcation.4 In politics, ideo-
logically similar parties can engage in relatively “friendly” competition
over voters, but ultimately cooperate and ally to form a coalition,
while ideologically polarized parties often have fundamentally hostile
and competitive relationships. Group members' psychological involve-
ment and perceived stakes of competition with another group are
determined by speciﬁc features that characterize the competition, and
can be subjective, i.e., independent of the objective threat imposed by
the other group or the extent to which its goals are incongruent with
those of the own group (Kilduff et al., 2010).
Carefully selecting the speciﬁc natural groups in the studies allowed
us to quasi-experimentally manipulate the degree of enmity between
groups. The football clubs (Study 1) and political parties (Study 2) that
deﬁne group membership were chosen such that cross-matching them
(within each study) yields bothweak- and strong-enmity pairs.Matching
a group of fans (supporters) of a certain club (party) with another group
of fans (supporters) of the same club (party) yields a no-enmity pair. In
this case intergroup conﬂict stems only from the structure of the strategic
interaction, as in previous research with artiﬁcial laboratory groups.
Stronger degrees of enmity can lead to an increasedmotivation to partic-
ipate in intergroup conﬂict, and are associatedwith negative attitudes to-
wards the outgroup (Jackson, 2002; Riek et al., 2006; Sherif et al., 1961),
which in turn lead to outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999).We therefore expect
that more enmity will be related to an increased willingness to harm, or
to avoid helping, the outgroup.
Another characteristic of natural groups, which is absent from artiﬁ-
cial groups, is the degree to which they aremorality-based. Members of
morality-based groups share convictions about standards andprinciples
on the distinction between right and wrong, as opposed to attitudes on
matters of taste and preference (good or bad). Importantly, the degree
to which shared moral convictions form the basis of a morality-based
group depends on the existence of a salient outgroup holding opposing
moral convictions (Haidt, 2001). For example, attitudes regarding the
legality of abortion in the United States deﬁne distinct morality-based
groups (pro-choice vs. pro-life) on the national level, where the respec-
tive outgroups are highly salient, but not in the context of, e.g., post
graduate democrats, where pro-choice is nearly consensual.5
At the interpersonal level, disagreements on matters of morality are
accompanied by strong emotions, intolerance, a desire for social/
physical distance, lack of goodwill, and little regard for procedural safe-
guards (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Relying on these results, Parker
and Janoff-Bulman conjecture that this pattern should be relevant to in-
tergroup relations aswell, such that outgroup negativity will play a cen-
tral role when groups are morality-based. They show that members of
morality-based groups display more negative emotions towards
(morally distinct) outgroups than members of non-morality-based
groups. We incorporate morality-based groups into our investigation
via the choice of parties in Study 2.
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To allow for displays of outgroup hate by help-avoidance, rather
than by active harm, we introduce a positive variant of the IPD-MD.
Similarly to the original IPD-MD, players can choose between non-
contribution, an individually costly contribution to a within-group
pool which beneﬁts the ingroup and does not affect the outgroup, or
an individually costly contribution to a between-group pool which
affects both the ingroup and the outgroup. The difference is that the ex-
ternality that contribution to the between-group pool imposes on the
outgroup is negative in the original IPD-MD, but positive in the positive
variant of the IPD-MD (see Table 1).6
The motivations associated with contribution to the within- and
between-grouppools in the positive variant are, to a large degree, oppo-
site those in the previously explored IPD-MD. Collective welfare ismax-
imized by contribution to thewithin-group pool in the original IPD-MD,
but by contribution to the between-grouppool in the positive variant. In
both games contribution to either pool beneﬁts the ingroup to the same
degree, but while this can be done either with (between-group pool) or
without (within-group pool) harming the outgroup in the original IPD-
MD, in the positive variant the choice is between helping the outgroup
(between-group pool) or avoiding to do so (within-group pool).
The positive variant is included in our study not only as a compari-
son to the original IPD-MD, but also as a realisticmodel of intergroup re-
lations in itself. In some cases, group members face a choice between
providing an exclusively internal public good (club good or local good;
Cornes & Sandler, 1996), or one that can be enjoyed by the outgroup
as well, as modeled by the positive variant.7
Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 relate to both studies. Hypothesis 4 relates
only to Study 2.
Hypothesis 1. More overall contributions (regardless of pool) in the
original IPD-MD and the positive variant of the IPD-MD than in the
IPD. Previous research on intergroup conﬂict between artiﬁcial labora-
tory groups (mainly Halevy et al., 2008; Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein,
2012) found more overall contributions in the original IPD-MD than
the IPD.We expect this result to hold for the natural groupswe examine
as well, in both versions of the IPD-MD.
Hypothesis 2. More outgroup hatewhen enmity is stronger. In both the
original IPD-MDand thepositive variantwe expect that groupmembers
will be more prone to display outgroup hate the stronger the enmity
between their club/party and that of the club/party supported by
members of the other group. This hypothesis follows from the relation
between degree of enmity and negative attitudes (Jackson, 2002; Riek
et al., 2006; Sherif et al., 1961), and that of negative attitudes with
outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999). A particular case of this hypothesis is
that when there is no enmity at all between the groups, i.e., conﬂict
stems only from the structure of the game, as in previous research
with artiﬁcial laboratory groups, there will be less outgroup hate as
compared to conﬂict between groups with at last some enmity.
Hypothesis 3. More outgroup hate in the positive variant than in the
original IPD-MD. Following the positive–negative asymmetry in social
discrimination (e.g., Mummendey et al., 2000), we expect to ﬁnd more
outgroup hate in the positive variant, where it can be expressed by6 The positive variant of the IPD-MD is similar to a Nested Social Dilemma (NSD; Wit &
Kerr, 2002) in that it distinguishes between two (personally costly) pro-social actions,
one beneﬁting only the ingroup and the other beneﬁting the larger collective (irrespective
of group membership). In a NSD, however, the collectively optimal action is costly from
the ingroup's point of view, whereas it is costless in the positive variant of the IPD-MD.
7 For example, a local lake-cleaning project has no effect on neighboring districts/coun-
tries, but a river-cleaning project also helps downstream communities.help-avoidance, than in the original IPD-MD, where it can be expressed
by active harm.
Hypothesis 4. More outgroup hate in interactions with a morality-
based outgroup. In both the original IPD-MD and the positive variant
we expect group members to be particularly prone to display outgroup
hate when interacting with morality-based outgroups. Previous work
found a similar pattern with respect to negative emotions (Parker &
Janoff-Bulman, 2013).Study 1 — football fans
The groups we investigate in Study 1 are fans of four ﬁrst-league
(Bundesliga) German football clubs— Borussia Dortmund (BD), FC Schalke
04 (FCS), 1. FCKöln (FCK), andBayer04 Leverkusen (BL). Using fans of foot-
ball clubs, and these teams in particular, has a fewadvantages. First, football
is themost popular sport inGermany (arguably in theworld).Manypeople
identify as fans and are highly committed to their fan group (77% of
Germans are interested in the German Bundesliga; Schnabel, 2009). The
high level of interest is important because domain interest is a predictor
of intergroup schadenfreude (pleasure at another's misfortune; Leach,
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003, demonstrated this phenomena
among Dutch football fans). Second, cultural and socio-economic differ-
ences between the groups are largely avoided in comparison to other
group categories, e.g., nationality, religion, or political afﬁliation.
Finally, bymatching groups of fans according to the degree of enmity
between their supported clubs, we can quasi-experimentally manipu-
late the degree of enmity with the opponent group. Considering the
four clubswe investigate, BD and FCS have perhaps the strongest histor-
ic rivalry8 in the German Bundesliga (dubbed the “Ruhr Derby”, as both
clubs are located in the Ruhr region in the German state of North Rhine-
Westphalia), and BL and FCK have an established historic rivalry as well
(the “Middle Rhine Derby”). Apart from these two pairs there is no spe-
cial conﬂict between the teams, aside from that which arises from regu-
lar competition in the same league (e.g., there is no particular conﬂict
between BD and BL; see Fig. 1 (left) and the Method section below for
more details on matching and on the degree of enmity manipulation).Method
Participants and design
Three hundred ninety-ﬁve football fans completed an online study
using EFS survey by Questback. A link to the study was posted on various
web pages related to the four clubs (e.g., fan bulletin boards) and emailed
to fan clubs. The completion ratewas 64% (614 persons began the study).
The study included an intergroup conﬂict game followed by a question-
naire. Participants' mean age was 35 years (SD= 12.46; completed by
275 participants) and 14% were female (completed by 274 participants).
31% of the participants had a university degree, 32% a high school degree,
and 37% a lower, or no, academic qualiﬁcation. Overall, participants were
quite active fans: 34% attended all home games, 29% attended most
games, and 30% attended some games in the current season.
We used a 3 (degree of enmity with the opponent group: none vs.
weak vs. strong) × 3 (game: IPD vs. original IPD-MD vs. positive variant
of IPD-MD) between-subjects design. Each participant was assigned
with probability 1/9 to one of the conditions.98 Note that ‘rivalry’ is not identical to ‘enmity’. While ‘rivalry’ refers to a state of compe-
tition between individuals or groups, ‘enmity’ is a feeling of active hostility that often ac-
companies rivalry.
9 Therewas a probability of 1/3 of being assigned to eachof the three “degreeof enmity”
conditions. Since each clubhad two “weak enmity” clubs associatedwith it, the probability
of being matched with each of them was 1/6.
Fig. 1. In study 1, the degree of enmity between opposing groupswasmanipulated bymatching a group of fans of a given clubwith another group of fans of the same club (e.g., BD vs. BD;
no-enmity); with a group of fans of a club with no special rivalry (e.g., BD vs. FCK; weak-enmity); or with a group of fans of a club with a strong historic rivalry (e.g., BD vs. FCS; strong-
enmity). In study 2 the same was done for supporters of political parties.
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At the beginning of the online study participants were informed that
upon its completion six of themwill be chosen at random, and that only
these sixwill be paid according to their decisions (whichwas indeed the
case). Each participant was then informed that he/she is a member of a
three-person group, together with two other participants who are fans
of the same club; that their group will be matched with another
three-person group, whose members are also fans of one particular
club; and which club that is. The degree of enmity (none, weak, or
strong) between the two groups was manipulated via the identities of
the clubs supported by members of each group (see Fig. 1, left).
Participants were then told that they have three actions to choose
from (two in the IPD); that their decision has ﬁnancial consequences
for themselves, their two group members, and the three members of
the opposing group; and that the other participants have exactly the
same options, all affecting each other's outcomes.
They could selﬁshly keep an endowmentworth €40; contribute it to
a between-group pool, which, in the IPD and original IPD-MD helps the
ingroup and harms the outgroup, and in the positive variant of the IPD-
MD helps the ingroup and the outgroup; or, in the IPD-MD games, con-
tribute to a within-group pool, which helps the ingroup without affect-
ing the outgroup.
The available actions and their monetary consequences are
displayed in Table 1.10 The actions were not labeled or named (see Fig.
S1 in the Supplementary Online Materials for a decision screen). After
seeing a detailed example of possible choices and their consequences,
participants chose the option that best suits their preferences. Finally,
they completed a short questionnaire assessing their attitude towards
fans of each of the four clubs and basic demographics (age, gender, ed-
ucation level). The study took about 10 min to complete.
Dependent variables
Decision in the game. The main dependent variable was the choice be-
tween non-contribution or contribution to the between-group pool in10 To avoid negative outcomes, €50 were added to participants' payoff in the IPD and
original IPD-MD. For similarity, €10 were added to participants' payoff in the positive var-
iant of the IPD-MD, although negative outcomes were not possible in this game.the IPD, or between non-contribution, contribution to the between-
group pool, or contribution to the within-group pool in the IPD-MD
games. In the original IPD-MD contribution to thewithin-group pool in-
dicates ingroup love and contribution to the between-group pool indi-
cates outgroup hate. In the positive variant contribution to the within-
group pool indicates outgroup hate and contribution to the between-
group pool indicates ingroup love.
Attitude towards fan groups. The attitude towards each of the four fan
groups was assessed by the following four items: “What is your general
attitude regarding the fans of BD/FCS/FCK/BL?” (1 = very negative to
7=very positive). The responseswere used for a degree enmitymanip-
ulation check.11
Results
A manipulation check conﬁrmed that the three degree of enmity condi-
tions coincide with participants' attitude ratings towards the different
fangroups (see SupplementaryOnlineMaterials). Fig. 2 shows thepropor-
tion of non-contribution and of contribution to each pool for each degree
of enmity with the opponent group, separately for each game. We tested
the effects of the game and the degree of enmity on participants' decisions
with a generalized linear mixed effect model (with a logit link function),
using the lme4package (Bates,Maechler, & Bolker, 2012) in the R environ-
ment (R Core Team, 2012). The speciﬁc fan group of the decision maker
and that of the opposing groupweremodeled as randomeffects to control
for their interrelated error terms (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000).
Non-contribution vs. contribution. We ﬁrst analyzed the effect of the
game (IPD vs. both versions of the IPD-MD) and of the degree of enmity
with the opponent group on overall contributions (non-contribution vs.
contribution to either pool).12 Regression coefﬁcients, standard errors,
95% conﬁdence intervals, and p-values are presented in Table 211 We used these items as a proxy for the degree of enmity, rather than a more direct
measure, because they are applicable to one's own group aswell as to other groups (which
is necessary to have a comparable measure for the no-enmity condition).
12 The result of this analysis does not change qualitatively when separately comparing
the IPD to the original IPD-MD or to the positive variant.
Table 2
Generalized linear mixed effect models (Study 1 — football fans).
Effect of game and degree of enmity on overall contributions
Without interaction With interaction
Predictor b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI
Intercept −0.12 0.29 −0.70 0.46 0.25 0.39 −0.51 1.01
Game
IPD (Ref)
IPD-MD (both) (2) 1.39⁎⁎⁎ 0.26 0.88 1.89 0.87⁎ 0.43 0.02 1.72
Degree of enmity
None (Ref)
Weak (2) 0.71⁎ 0.31 0.10 1.32 0.24 0.49 −0.72 1.19
Strong (3) 0.45 0.29 −0.12 1.02 −0.09 0.48 −1.04 0.86
Interaction
Game (2) × Enmity (2) – – – – 0.74 0.64 −0.53 2.00
Game (2) × Enmity (3) – – – – 0.83 0.61 −0.36 2.03
Effect of game and degree of enmity on outgroup hate
Without interaction With interaction
Predictor b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI
Intercept −1.55⁎⁎⁎ 0.33 −2.18 −0.91 −0.73⁎ 0.35 −1.42 −0.05
Game
IPD-MD (Ref)
IPD-MD positive (2) 0.51† 0.29 −0.06 1.08 −1.21⁎ 0.59 −2.37 −0.05
Degree of enmity
None (Ref)
Weak (2) 0.40 0.38 −0.35 1.14 −0.55 0.53 −1.60 0.49
Strong (3) 1.30⁎⁎⁎ 0.35 0.61 2.00 0.00 0.49 −0.95 0.96
Interaction
Game (2) × Enmity (2) – – – – 1.97⁎ 0.80 0.41 3.53
Game (2) × Enmity (3) – – – – 2.67⁎⁎⁎ 0.76 1.19 4.15
b= regression coefﬁcients; SE= standard errors; Ref= reference group; 95% CI= 95% conﬁdence intervals (based on the estimated local curvature of the likelihood surface). En-dashes
indicate that the variable was not included in the model.
Note: All models considered the speciﬁc fan group (e.g., BD, FCS) of the decision maker and that of the opposing group as random effects.
† p b 0.1, ⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎ p b 0.01, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001
Fig. 2. Study 1: Proportion of participants who chose non-contribution (to keep their endowment), ingroup love, or outgroup hate in each game (IPD, original IPD-MD and positive variant
of IPD-MD) and for each degree of enmitywith the opposing group (none, weak-enmity, strong-enmity). Ingroup love stands for thewithin-group pool in the original IPD-MD and for the
between-group pool in the positive variant; outgroup hate stands for the between-group pool in the original IPD-MD, and for the within-group pool in the positive variant of the IPD-MD.
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were signiﬁcantly higher than in the IPD (58%; indicated by the IPD-MD
predictor). Adding the interaction term to the model revealed that
this was the case irrespective of the degree of enmity with the oppo-
nent group. This result supports Hypothesis 1, as well as previous re-
search (Halevy et al., 2008; Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012), by
showing that contributions increase when they are not necessarily
tied with harming the opponent group. These contribution rates
are noticeably higher than those commonly observed in the litera-
ture, for example by Halevy et al. (2008) and Halevy, Weisel, &13 p-Values in the table refer to two-tailed tests; unless stated otherwise, we refer to p-
values below 0.05 as indicating a signiﬁcant difference.Bornstein (2012) who observe around 30% in the IPD and 35%–55%
in the (original) IPD-MD.
Ingroup love vs. outgroup hate. Next, we turned our attention to the IPD-
MD games. While the ingroup love pools (the within-group pool in the
original IPD-MD, the between-group pool in the positive variant)
attracted the majority of participants (56% and 53%, respectively),
there were also substantial contributions to the outgroup hate pools
(the between-group pool in the original IPD-MD, the within-group
pool in the positive variant): 23% in the IPD-MD, and 35% in the positive
variant (the difference is marginally signiﬁcant, p= .077; Table 2, bot-
tom). These ﬁgures are much higher than the 4–6% obtained by
Halevy et al. (2008) and Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein (2012).
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MD is the effect of the degree of enmity with the opponent group.
There was signiﬁcantly more outgroup hate when facing a strong-
enmity opponent, relative to facing a no-enmity opponent (strong pre-
dictor in bottom part of Table 2). However, adding the interaction terms
to the regression equation shows that this effect is solely due to the pos-
itive variant (where even facing a weak-enmity opponent increased
outgroup hate), and not at all to the original IPD-MD game, where the
degree of enmity did not matter. Related Hypothesis 2 is supported
only for the positive variant, and not for the original IPD-MD.
Two points are noteworthy. The ﬁrst is that the relation between de-
gree of enmity and outgrouphate in the positive variant is not accompa-
nied by a similar relation between degree of enmity and overall
contributions, suggesting a two-stage process. Group members ﬁrst
choose—independent of degree of enmity—whether to contribute or
not; and only then (if applicable) they choose between ingroup love
and outgroup hate. The latter choice is related to degree of enmity
only in the positive variant. The second point is that in the positive var-
iant themajority (60%) of participants facing a strong-enmity opponent
group chose to display outgroup hate. In other words, outgroup hate
was the predominant behavioral motivation of more than half of our
participants when it involved withholding resources from a strong-
enmity opponent.15 The NPD is considered neo-Nazi and has borderline legitimacy in German politics.
There is a current attempt to ban it from German politics, after a previous attempt failedStudy 2 — supporters of political parties
Study 2was conductedwith twomain objectives inmind. It could be
that the results in Study 1 are due to unique features of the groups we
examined (fans of German football clubs). Therefore, the ﬁrst objective
was to extend, or possibly qualify, our results by examining another set
of naturally occurring rivalrous groups. The second objective was to in-
clude morality-based (out)groups in our examination.
The groups we examine in Study 2 are based on political afﬁliation.
Socio-demographic differences, which naturally exist between sup-
porters of different parties, were mitigated by including only students
in our sample.14 The degree of enmity was manipulated as in Study 1,
by having each group composed of supporters of the same party. The
core of the design, aimed at replicating and extending Study 1, is provid-
ed by supporters of the following four Germanmainstream parties: The
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), The Social Democratic Party (SPD),
The Free Democratic Party (FDP), and The Greens (GREENS). Two
additional parties from the political extreme—The Left (LEFT) and the
National Democratic Party (NPD)—were included to provide morality-
based outgroups. The Left was later dropped from the analysis because
supporters of the mainstream parties did not perceive it to be as
morality-distinct as the NPD (see Supplementary Online Materials for
more details).
Recent coalitions in Germanywere formed, in various constellations,
by the four mainstream parties in our study. The CDU and the SPD are
the two largest parties, and the only ones with the pretense of forming
and leading the coalition. The FDP is the “natural” coalition partner of
the CDU (government partners in the German Bundestag in
1961–1966, 1982–1998, and 2009–2013), and GREENS is the “natural”
coalition partner of the SPD (1998–2005). Given this structure we ex-
pected that the degree of enmity would be strong between parties
from opposing sides of the German political divide (i.e., GREENS and
SPD on one side, CDU and FDP on the other), andweak between natural
coalition partners. The result is a very similar design to Study 1, with the
exception that in Study 1 each fan grouphad one strong- and twoweak-14 A possible concern is that students might not havewell-formed political opinions and
preferences. However, we conducted the study during the nine days leading to the 2013
general national elections, when involvement in politics is maximal. When asked to indi-
cate which party they support (by choosing a party from amenu), 91.1% of those who be-
gan the online study were able to do so.enmity outgroups,while in Study 2 each supporter group has oneweak-
and two strong-enmity outgroups (see Fig. 1, right).
While political preferences among mainstream parties in Germany
surely involve moral aspects, the discourse is mild in comparison with,
e.g., the United States. The mainstream parties are not as polarized,
the relations among them are not as conﬂictual, and many consider
them to have more in common than in separation. To include
morality-based groups, we added two extreme parties, one from the
far-right (the National Democratic Party of Germany, NPD) and the
other from the far-left (the Left Party, LEFT) of the political spectrum.15
Among these two parties the NPD is clearly more controversial and
more likely to beperceived asmorally distinct bymainstreamvoters. In-
deed, a manipulation check showed that the NPD is perceived as a
morality-based outgroup by supporters of all four mainstream parties,
whereas the LEFT is not. Accordingly, we omitted the LEFT from the
analysis, and treated the NPD as the sole morality-based outgroup in
our sample.16
Method
Themethod of Study 2was nearly identical to that of Study 1. Differ-
ences are highlighted below.
Participants and design
Two thousand three hundred seventy-ﬁve students from three German
universities (University of Erfurt, University of Jena, and RWTH Aachen
University) responded to an email inviting them to take part in an on-
line questionnaire with the possibility to earn money. One thousand
ﬁve hundred and ﬁfty were eventually included in our sample
(nErfurt=279, nJena=832, nAachen=438, 1 missing value). The remain-
ing 825 were excluded for the following reasons: 161 did not support
any of the six parties they could choose from; 14 supported the NPD;
326 supported the LEFT; and 324 peoplewerematchedwith supporters
of the LEFT. Participants' mean age was 25 years (SD= 5.34) and 45%
were female.
We used a 4 (degree of enmity with the opponent group: none vs.
weak vs. strong vs. morality-based) × 3 (game: IPD vs. original IPD-
MD vs. positive variant of IPD-MD) between-subjects design. Partici-
pants were assigned randomly to one of the three games, and there
was an equal probability of being matched with supporters of each of
the six parties in the initial design (including the LEFT). After removing
the LEFT, the probability of being matched with one of the two strong-
enmity outgroups was therefore double (2/5) that of being matched
with the ingroup, a weak-enmity outgroup, or a morality-based
outgroup (1/5 each).
Procedure
At the beginning of the study participants were asked which party
they supported, from a menu including CDU, SPD, FDP, GREENS, NPD,
and the LEFT. They could also indicate that they do not support any of
these parties, in which case they were thanked and did not proceed.
Each participant was then informed that he/she belongs to a three-
person group, with two other supporters of the same party; that their
group will be matched with another three-person group, whosein 2003 (Hamann, 2013). The LEFT is an indirect successor of the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany that ruled the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) until 1989.
Although the fourth largest party in the Bundestag, it has never been part of the govern-
ment in uniﬁed Germany, and for many Germans it serves as a direct reminder of what
they consider an unfortunate part of German history.
16 See Supplementary Online Materials for details on the manipulation check and for an
analysis that includes the LEFT.
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strategic situation was presented exactly as in Study 1. The question-
naire at the end assessed attitudes towards supporters of each of the
six parties (and basic demographics).
Results
A manipulation check conﬁrmed that the three degree of enmity
conditions coincide with participants' attitude ratings towards the dif-
ferent parties (see Supplementary Online Materials). Fig. 3 shows the
proportion of non-contribution and of contribution to each pool for
each degree of enmity with the opponent group, separately for each
game. For the statistical analysis, we applied the samegeneralized linear
mixed effect model as in Study 1 (Bates et al., 2012; Pinheiro & Bates,
2000; R Core Team, 2012).
Non-contribution vs. contribution. We ﬁrst analyzed the effect of the de-
gree of enmity with the opponent group and of the game (IPD vs. both
versions of the IPD-MD) on overall contributions. Regression coefﬁ-
cients, standard errors, 95% conﬁdence intervals, and signiﬁcance levels
are presented in Table 3 (top). Overall contributions in the IPD-MD
games (68%) were signiﬁcantly higher than in the IPD (36%), providing
further support for Hypothesis 1. The interaction terms show that this
effect is strongest for no-enmity, and is signiﬁcantly weaker for
strong-enmity and morality-based opponents (note the negative inter-
action coefﬁcients for strong-enmity and morality-based opponents).
The effect is also signiﬁcantly weaker for morality-based than for
strong-enmity opponents (p b 0.01; obtained by re-running the regres-
sion with strong-enmity as the reference level of the degree of enmity
dummy variable).
The above pattern suggests that the difference in contributions
between the IPD and IPD-MD games diminishes as conﬂict grows
more severe. Still, contributions in the IPD-MD games are signiﬁ-
cantly higher than in the IPD for weak- (p b .001) and strong-
enmity opponents (p b .001), and the difference is marginally signif-
icant for morality-based opponents (p= .070; p-values obtained by
re-running the regression with different orders of dummy vari-
ables). These results can be interpreted as strengthening Study 1
in supporting Halevy et al. (2008) and Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein
(2012) by showing that for all degrees of enmity, and even for
morality-based outgroups, contributions in the IPD are lower than
in the IPD-MD games. At the same time, they add to Study 1 by
showing that the magnitude of the tendency to increase overall con-
tributions in the IPD-MD relative to IPD is not independent of the
degree of enmity between the groups; most notably, it is reduced
in interactions between groups with a morality-based outgroup.Fig. 3. Study 2: Proportion of participants who chose non-contribution (to keep their endowmen
of IPD-MD) and for each degree of enmitywith the opposing group (none, weak-enmity, strong-
MD and for the between-group pool in the positive variant; outgroup hate stands for the betwe
of the IPD-MD.Ingroup love vs. outgroup hate. Focusing on the IPD-MD games reveals
that there was more outgroup hate in the positive variant than in the
original IPD-MD (Table 3, bottom), conﬁrming Hypothesis 3. There
was more outgroup hate in strong-enmity than no-enmity, and even
more with morality-based opponents. Adding the interaction terms re-
veals that the difference in outgroup hate between the original IPD-MD
and the positive variant was largest for morality-based opponents, and
not signiﬁcant for no-enmity opponents. The model with interactions
also shows that the difference between no- and strong-enmity was
not signiﬁcant in the original IPD-MD (Table 3), but was in the positive
variant (p b 0.01, obtained by re-running the regression with the posi-
tive variant as the reference level), replicating the result from Study 1.
As long as conﬂict does not have a strongmoral aspect, the degree of en-
mitymatters only in the positive variant, andnot in the original IPD-MD.
Thus, in both studies, Hypothesis 2 is supported only for the positive
variant of the IPD-MD.
Morality-based groups showed the highest levels of outgroup hate
in both the original IPD-MD and the positive variant, conﬁrming
Hypothesis 4 (Table 3, bottom). However, in the original IPD-MD,
outgroup hate is not the prevalent choice even in conﬂict with a
morality-based outgroup. Instead, there are practically identical levels
of ingroup love and outgroup hate; about half of those choosing to
contribute restrict the effect of their contribution to the ingroup and
avoid harming outgroupmembers. This result is a strong demonstration
of the reluctance many people have towards actively harming others,
even if they are members of a negatively viewed and morally opposed
outgroup.
Discussion
We contribute to the social psychological literature on intergroup
conﬂicts and its motivational underpinnings (e.g., Allport, 1954; De
Dreu, 2010; Halevy et al., 2008) by examining behavior of members of
natural groups—football fans and supporters of political parties—with
varying degrees of enmity in three intergroup conﬂict games. Along
with two previously established intergroup conﬂict games—the Inter-
group Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game and the Intergroup Prisoner's
Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game—we introduced a
novel positive variant of the latter, which allows for expressions of
outgroup hate by help-avoidance.
There are two main messages from our studies. The ﬁrst is that the
main result of Halevy et al. (2008), and Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein
(2012)—that much of the competitive behavior observed in the IPD is
eliminated when an option to maximize absolute, rather than relative,
ingroup gains is introduced—holds even for members of rivalrous
groups. This was the case for both football fans and supporters oft), ingroup love, or outgroup hate in each game (IPD, original IPD-MD and positive variant
enmity,morality-based). Ingroup love stands for thewithin-group pool in the original IPD-
en-group pool in the original IPD-MD, and for thewithin-group pool in the positive variant
Table 3
Generalized linear mixed effect models (Study 2 — supporters of political parties).
Effect of game and degree of enmity on overall contributions
Without interaction With interaction
Predictor b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI
Intercept −0.69⁎⁎⁎ 0.19 −1.06 −0.33 −1.06⁎⁎⁎ 0.24 −1.53 −0.58
Game
IPD (Ref)
IPD-MD (both) (2) 1.36⁎⁎⁎ 0.11 1.13 1.58 1.95⁎⁎⁎ 0.25 1.45 2.45
Degree of enmity
None (Ref)
Weak (2) 0.02 0.17 −0.32 0.35 0.13 0.30 −0.46 0.72
Strong (3) 0.04 0.14 −0.24 0.32 0.43† 0.25 −0.05 0.92
Morality-based (4) 0.12 0.17 −0.21 0.46 1.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.29 0.50 1.65
Interaction
Game (2) × Enmity (2) – – – – −0.23 0.38 −0.97 0.50
Game (2) × Enmity (3) – – – – −0.64⁎ 0.31 −1.25 −0.03
Game (2) × Enmity (4) – – – – −1.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.36 −2.20 −0.79
Effect of game and degree of enmity on outgroup hate
Without interaction With interaction
Predictor b SE 95% CI b SE 95% CI
Intercept −2.51⁎⁎⁎ 0.28 −3.06 −1.95 −2.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.37 −2.84 −1.38
Game
IPD-MD (Ref)
IPD-MD positive (2) 1.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.19 0.65 1.42 0.40 0.50 −0.58 1.37
Degree of enmity
None (Ref)
Weak (2) 0.52 0.33 −0.13 1.17 0.05 0.55 −1.03 1.12
Strong (3) 0.82⁎⁎ 0.29 0.26 1.38 0.54 0.43 −0.31 1.39
Morality-based (4) 2.78⁎⁎⁎ 0.32 2.15 3.41 2.08⁎⁎⁎ 0.46 1.18 2.97
Interaction
Game (2) × Enmity (2) – – – – 0.75 0.69 −0.61 2.10
Game (2) × Enmity (3) – – – – 0.45 0.57 −0.67 1.57
Game (2) × Enmity (4) – – – – 1.38⁎ 0.66 0.09 2.67
b= regression coefﬁcients; SE= standard errors; Ref= reference group; 95% CI= 95% conﬁdence intervals (based on the estimated local curvature of the likelihood surface). En-dashes
indicate that the variable was not included in the model.
Note: All models considered the speciﬁc party (e.g., CDU, SPD) of the decision maker and that of the opposing group as random effects.
† p b 0.1, ⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎ p b 0.01, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001
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optimistic message, strengthening the assertion that “intergroup con-
ﬂicts can be resolved by channeling group member's altruism towards
internal group causes” (Halevy et al., 2008, p. 410). Even when conﬂict
had a strong moral ﬂavor, outgroup hate was reduced in the IPD-MD
relative to the IPD, with only about half of the contributors opting for
outgroup hate over ingroup love.17
The second message is not so optimistic. When given the chance to
beneﬁt a strong-enmity outgroup, and even more so a morality-based
outgroup, many group members decline to do so. In these settings the
desire to increase relative gains, or to simply harm the outgroup, plays
an important role. This is unfortunate because of the loss of potential so-
cial gains, which is not different, in principle, from the losses associated
with actively harming the outgroup. This result is particularly striking
for morality-based groups, where 85% of those who chose to contribute
in the positive variant of the IPD-MDdid sowithout (costlessly) helping
outgroup members.
The difference we observed between negative and positive displays
of outgroup hate is in agreement with previous work on minimal
groups, which has found more intergroup discrimination in the alloca-
tion of positive resources than negative resources (e.g., Buhl, 1999;
Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Mummendey et al., 1992, 2000). Several
explanationsmay account for this result. One possibility is a general ten-
dency to evaluate negative eventsmore negativelywhen they are due to17 As intergroup relations are affected by social norms that vary across cultural settings
and over time, these ﬁndings may be subject to historical and cultural changes (Gergen,
1973). Outgroup hate may play a different role in settings other than modern-day
Germany.commission rather than to omission (e.g., Spranca, Minsk, & Baron,
1991). In social interaction, discrimination may be perceived as less ap-
propriate when it involves active harm of the outgroup than passive
help-avoidance. Another option is that western societies, where most
studies showing the positive–negative asymmetry were conducted
(including the present study), are characterized by a promotion focus
(concern for approaching positive events, rather than avoiding negative
ones), which has been shown to crucially moderate the prevalence
of discrimination in helping behavior (Sassenberg, Kessler, &
Mummendey, 2003). Yet another possible explanation for the reluc-
tance to help outgroup members has to do with status conferral.
While harming outgroups decreases prestige but increases dominance,
helping outgroups decreases both prestige and dominance, and is thus
less attractive (Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012). Our results
suggest that this status conferral pattern is relevant mainly for strong-
enmity or morality-based opponent groups.
The degree of enmity between groups—the focus of the current
investigation—is not the only characteristic of intergroup relations that
might be relevant for outgroup hate. Another important characteristic
is the relative deprivation/gratiﬁcation of one group versus the other.
Relative deprivation is particularly relevant; in minimal group settings
it induces outgroup derogation (Moscatelli, Albarello, Prati, & Rubini,
2014) and outgroup hate in the IPD-MD game (Halevy, Chou, Cohen,
& Bornstein, 2010). In the present context, however, relative depriva-
tion/gratiﬁcation is not trivial to assess. Straight forward measures like
league standings or poll predictions can be misleading, as they fail to
take into account differences in expectations (based on, e.g., previous
league standings or current parliament seats) and resources
(e.g., player salary, campaign budget). We tried to reduce the saliency
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to be removed from direct matches between the clubs. In Study 2 this
was obviously not possible. Given its relevance in minimal group
settings, it is of interest to address the role of relative deprivation/
gratiﬁcation in natural group settings as well.
Our results on morality-based groups reﬂect positively on the
conjecture that outgroup hate is particularly likely in morality-based
conﬂict (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). We found this to be the case
when outgroup hate could be displayed by directly harming the
outgroup, and by refraining from help as well. These ﬁndings extend
previous results, which rely on self-reported outgroup emotions, to
actual behavior.
Moral-conﬂict aside, there was less outgroup hate in Study 2 (polit-
ical parties) than in Study 1 (football). Thismight be due to the relative-
ly mild political discourse in Germany, especially among the
mainstreams parties, even when they are on different sides of the
liberal-conservative political divide. Another reason might be that
football fans in Study 1 were approached via club-speciﬁc web pages
(e.g., fan bulletin boards), while participants in Study 2 were
approached via general student subject pools and indicated their party
afﬁliation after starting the survey. The result might be that our Study
1 sample is composed of fans with a relatively salient group afﬁliation.
Importantly, the overall results (more outgroup hate in the positive var-
iant than in the original IPD-MD, effect of degree of enmity on outgroup
hate only in the positive variant), even without considering morality-
based conﬂicts, are similar between Study 1 and Study 2.
An interesting route for further studies is to manipulate the way the
intergroup interaction is perceived by framing the situation in different
ways, for example by introducing different initial (default) allocations
to the different pools. If manifestations of outgroup hate, or discrimina-
tion, can indeed be reducedmerely by framing an interaction as involv-
ing active harm rather than passive help-avoidance, there are possible
policy implications. For example, stressing the similar ultimate conse-
quences of harm and help-avoidance via education or soft nudges
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) can help reduce the negative effects associat-
ed with discrimination.
The newly developed positive variant of the IPD-MD has theoretical
value beyond the scope of the current work. For example, according to
the BIAS map framework (Cuddy et al., 2007) very speciﬁc stereotypes
and emotions may give rise to either active or passive forms of discrim-
ination. More generally, Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) discuss at
length the methods used in previous discrimination studies, and con-
clude that “…researchers need to add methods… that (a) distinguish
ingroup-favorable from outgroup-hostile subject behavior” (p. 678).
The combination of the original IPD-MD and the positive variant pro-
vides a method that nicely meets this requirement, and may provide a
fresh approach to the study of intergroup prejudice and discrimination.
A better understanding of intergroup conﬂict is inevitably linked to a
better understanding of individuals' motivation for participation in the
conﬂict. Previous research suggested that ingroup love is the main mo-
tivation at play. We demonstrate that outgroup hate can also play an
important role, depending on the degree of enmity between the groups,
whether it involves imposing negative externalities or denying positive
externalities, and whether conﬂict is morality-based.
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